The Confucian-Communist Continuum
Confucianism and Communism—one an ancient orthodox ideology, the other a modern revolutionary theory—appear to have nothing in common. Yet within the long river of Chinese intellectual history, they reveal a striking thread of continuity. At the core of this thread lies the same form of progressivism: starting from an idealized society, subordinating itself to the logic of centralized state construction, and promoting social integration and institutional reconstruction through ideological monopoly. Whether it’s “Dismiss the Hundred Schools, Revere Only Confucianism” (罷黜百家，獨尊儒術) or “Only Communism Can Save China,” both point toward the same political project: using a universalized system of indoctrination to serve a centralized order.
I. Ideological Monopoly: From “Revering Only Confucianism” to “Ideological Unity”
The rise of Confucianism in the Han Dynasty was not a natural extension of Confucian thought, but rather the product of a state project. In the middle of the Western Han Dynasty, when centralized authority was first established, there was a need for an ideology that could suppress local separatism and strengthen the legitimacy of imperial power. Confucianism assumed this role at precisely this moment. The so-called “Dismiss the Hundred Schools, Revere Only Confucianism” was essentially the nationalization of the intellectual marketplace—converting a pluralistic and competitive intellectual environment into a single source of legitimacy, thereby endorsing imperial power.
This mirrors exactly the strategy of Communism’s implementation in China. Since the early 20th century, Enlightenment discourse has gradually been replaced by more radical progressivism, with Communism achieving complete ideological monopoly in this context. The Yan’an Rectification Movement (延安整風), thought reform, and class education represent the modern version of “Revere Only Confucianism.” The consistency in means and ends between these two systems shows that this is not open competition among free thoughts, but rather a co-constructed system of power and ideology: the regime consolidates its institutional legitimacy by monopolizing thought, thereby suppressing any intellectual heterogeneity that might threaten central order.
II. From Indoctrination to Enlightenment: Old Wine in New Bottles
Indoctrination and enlightenment, though seemingly opposed on the surface, are actually mirror images within the Chinese historical context. Confucian “transformation of the people through moral cultivation” (化民成俗) emphasizes top-down moral discipline to shape subjects’ behavior, while the enlightenment discourse since the May Fourth Movement sought to break with tradition in the name of reason, science, and individual freedom. In reality, this enlightenment was a modern articulation of indoctrination—both were projects to discipline the “backward masses,” serving a predetermined political vision of an ideal society.
The emergence of Communism marked the transformation and intensification of this progressive discourse. When enlightenment language was gradually replaced by revolutionary discourse, “transforming people” became the ultimate goal. The original May Fourth enlightenment spirit (pluralism, skepticism, freedom) was treated as a transitional form, ultimately giving way to a totalizing and exclusionary ideology. In this process, progressivism was no longer a means but became an end in itself: from indoctrination to enlightenment to the Party’s ideological work, the discursive packaging constantly renewed itself, but the underlying logic remained consistent—individuals were viewed as objects to be transformed, not as subjects of political discourse.
III. Pragmatic Compromise: Ideological Dependence and Contextual Action
The reason Confucianism could stand firm across successive dynasties was not due to the logical consistency of its theory, but rather its high adaptability to real power. It was more like a set of ethical technologies: preaching “loyalty to the ruler” in the face of authority, “benevolence and righteousness” in power vacuums, and “ritual collapse and musical decay” (禮崩樂壞) in chaotic times. It never challenged power but always found a way to accommodate its existence.
This parallels exactly the ideological evolution of the Communist Party. From Mao Zedong Thought to Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Important Thought of Three Represents, the Scientific Outlook on Development, and Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era—the transformation of this ideological system appears on the surface to respond to modern governance needs, but is actually strategic compromise with real circumstances. From class struggle to “let some people get rich first,” from revolution to “stability overrides everything,” their commonality lies not in theoretical coherence but in practicality and the reproduction of power legitimacy.
IV. Legitimacy Supply: Old Thinking for New Dynasties
In terms of political legitimacy sources, Chinese history has never truly embraced the liberal model of “consent of the governed.” Legitimacy comes from the Mandate of Heaven, from historical mission, from class representation—never from the free choice of the governed. This top-down view of legitimacy enables seamless transition between Confucian and Communist legitimacy construction: both emphasize “I understand your interests better than you do,” both deny spontaneous social order, and both govern with a “for your own good” attitude.
This legitimacy logic also cultivates a mentality of political dependence: the people are not subjects but passive recipients. Over time, society loses its capacity for spontaneous order, entering a stable state of “compliant citizen politics” (順民政治). At this point, any voice challenging orthodoxy is viewed as a destabilizing factor, even as betrayal of the state or nation.
V. Psychological Soil: From Moral Self-Discipline to Ideological Dependence
Chinese political culture has always tended toward moral governance and identity ethics, emphasizing “filial piety” (孝) and “loyalty” (忠), “proper names and roles” (名分) and “Mandate of Heaven” (天命). This psychological soil easily accepts secular power with sacred coloring. Confucianism speaks of “inner sage, outer king” (內聖外王), while the Communist Party speaks of “the Party commands the gun” and “ideological and political work”—both are internalized training for political submission.
This psychological structure makes it difficult for people to develop dependence on institutional safeguards, instead inclining them to seek “enlightened rulers,” “honest officials,” or “great leaders” to carry their imagination of justice. In this cultural context, institutional injustice and tyranny are not viewed as institutional errors but are often explained as “implementation deviations,” “individual corruption,” or “not communist enough.”
VI. Unity of Politics and Religion: Institutional Arrangements for Ideological Monopoly
Ultimately, whether it’s the Confucian classical learning system or the Communist Party’s ideological system, both are essentially not “thought” but “institutions”—both are theocratic ruling structures. The former relied on classical learning through imperial examinations and the scholar-official system, while the latter relies on Party schools, propaganda departments, and ideological censorship. Such institutional arrangements make thought no longer the freely flowing spiritual property of society, but part of the ruling order, even its most core pillar.
And all heterodox thoughts are not tolerated, not because of their content, but because they are uncontrolled.
VII. Conclusion: From Political-Religious Integration to Civilizational Defense—What is True Conservatism?
The ruling tradition in Chinese history has always tended to shape ideological orthodoxy through political orthodoxy, monopolizing truth and moral discourse through the integration of politics and religion. From the Confucian integration of ruler-teacher politics and religion to the modern ideological system established by the Communist Party, this governance technique combining political power with thought constitutes a “state religion politics” tradition spanning two thousand years. Whether it’s Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, or the Three Represents, Scientific Outlook on Development, and “Xi Jinping Thought for the New Era,” the essence behind these theoretical forms is the institutionalized process of state monopoly over truth—dissolving history in the name of history, commanding the present in the name of the future.
True conservative politics does not compete with such state religious systems for “sole legitimacy.” It is not an engineering technique aimed at future utopia, nor does it attempt to transform the real world with a complete belief system. The foundation of conservatism lies in historical memory, communal customs, and human limitations. It is a balanced grasp of order and freedom, a cherishing of pluralism and experiential wisdom—especially a profound vigilance against any attempt to elevate thought into ruling power.
This also makes it necessary for me to clarify the misuse and misreading of certain contemporary “religious conservatism.” In today’s Chinese-speaking world, there is a category of so-called “Christian conservatism” that is actually borrowing the name of religion to re-propose a future-oriented political ideal, essentially continuing the progressive indoctrination paradigm, just wrapped in Christian packaging. They are often not satisfied with maintaining faith traditions but want to use faith as a tool to reshape state institutions, social organizations, and even individual lifestyles.
However, the reason I support the Christian revival under Trumpism is precisely because it is essentially not a top-down political theology project, but a spontaneous response to and defense of original social faith. American Christian faith has never been shaped by government but is a way of life and moral foundation spontaneously formed by the people. Over the past several decades, the American left-wing government has used “separation of church and state” as a pretext to practice de-religionization, constantly forcing progressivism into schools, law, and civil society, forming an anti-traditional “new state religion.” Rather than establishing a new order, Trumpism is about restoring the faith order that originally belonged to the people and families, not to political power.
This is the same starting point from which I critique the Chinese “Confucian-Communist” system: opposing top-down monopolization of morality and thought, opposing the use of future names to cover up present history and reality, opposing the disguise of political power as the final arbiter of truth discourse.
Conservatism is not about creating another future kingdom of truth, but about defending those traditions, beliefs, and freedoms in the real world that have not yet been conquered by the state. It is not the creator of new religions but the guardian of civilizational defense lines. But this guardianship is not just about preventing destruction; it is more about preserving space for the spontaneous growth of order: letting families rather than the state become the starting point of ethics, letting churches rather than Party schools undertake spiritual guidance, letting communities rather than governments design public good.
Only when these spontaneous orders can grow naturally does civilization have a future; otherwise, no matter whether the banner reads Confucian, Communist, progressive, or sacred, they will all ultimately become the same thing—the total conquest of human life by rulers.
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