The global landscape is turbulent, with conflicts erupting worldwide and war-related news dominating headlines. Yet, while attention focuses on the Taiwan Strait, Ukraine, and the Middle East, the critical geopolitical pivots that could decisively shift the US-China power balance remain relatively quiet and underreported. Russia and the Philippines, in particular, are playing strategic roles far more significant than their surface appearance suggests.
This article argues that the trajectories of these two locations will exert a leveraged impact on the US-China rivalry. Russia will determine whether China’s land power retains sufficient strategic depth, while the Philippines could serve as China’s gateway to breaking through the First Island Chain. Whoever secures these pivots first will gain the upper hand in shaping the future Indo-Pacific landscape.
Spanning Eurasia with vast resources, Russia could either be a decisive barrier to China’s land power expansion or the strategic depth and hinterland for its maritime ambitions. The Philippines, positioned at the southern end of the First Island Chain and a key maritime hub, could either anchor the US’s containment of China or become the spearhead for China to breach the chain. This article contends that whoever achieves a breakthrough in these two pivots will reshape the Indo-Pacific strategic landscape and potentially alter the future global order.
Russia: The Geopolitical Lever for Strategic Balance
Russia is an indispensable geopolitical variable for both the US and China. If the US can win over Russia, it could not only encircle China’s land power but also disrupt the energy, military, and strategic synergies between China and Russia, thereby reducing the risk of a hot war in the Indo-Pacific. Conversely, if China solidifies Russia as its strategic rear, the US will face simultaneous pressures across the Eurasian theater.
Resources and Geopolitics: Opportunities and Challenges for the US
Russia possesses the world’s largest natural gas reserves, critical metals (such as titanium and nickel), and a robust military-industrial complex (accounting for 20% of its industrial output), positioning it as a potential alternative hub for global export manufacturing and energy supply. If the US lifts sanctions and channels capital and technology into Russia’s Far East and Siberian industrial bases, it could effectively divert markets and manufacturing capacity currently dominated by China.
Moreover, Russia’s deepening military cooperation with India (e.g., T-90 tanks, BrahMos missiles, and S-400 systems) could serve as a South Asian pillar for the US Indo-Pacific alliance, enabling a pincer strategy against China.
Sino-Russian Fissures and Trump’s Diplomatic Opportunity
In contrast to the Biden administration’s hawkish stance toward Russia, Trump has publicly advocated for and actively pursued ceasefire negotiations in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Since late 2024, he has engaged in multiple rounds of informal talks with Russian counterparts, proposing a framework of “freezing the frontlines in exchange for sanctions relief”: Russia would retain occupied territories, Ukraine would pause NATO membership bids, and the West would gradually lift SWIFT and energy restrictions, ultimately ending economic sanctions.
This approach aligns with Russia’s strategic needs amid high inflation (exceeding 8% in 2024) and the strain of a protracted war, creating an opportunity for the US to pry apart the Sino-Russian alliance and rebalance Eurasia. Trump’s diplomatic style prioritizes reciprocity and tangible outcomes, balancing sovereignty, tradition, the status quo, and practical interests in a pragmatic rather than ideological manner. Coupled with Republican control of Congress and growing domestic fatigue over Ukraine aid, this forms a realistic political and institutional foundation for a “pivot to Russia to contain China” strategy.
Should this strategy materialize in 2025, the US could swiftly achieve a preliminary strategic reconciliation with Russia, compressing China’s geopolitical and economic space on both land and sea.
Russia’s Hedging Strategy and the Risk of Delayed Defection
Despite optimism for a “pivot to Russia to contain China,” it must be acknowledged that Russia may not be eager to align definitively at this stage. A more likely scenario is that Russia opts to delay commitment, maintaining leverage with both the US and China to maximize gains as their rivalry intensifies.
Specifically, Russia might tacitly or even actively support China’s efforts to breach the First Island Chain in the short term, thereby escalating US-China strategic tensions and pushing both powers into more intense military competition. This would compel the US to allocate greater resources to the Indo-Pacific, weakening its capacity to intervene in Europe and creating strategic breathing room for Russia.
Such a “hedging and delayed defection” approach aligns with Russia’s geopolitical tradition: maintaining flexibility in great-power rivalries, avoiding binding commitments to any single side, and treating its alignment as a tradable strategic asset. To achieve a genuine breakthrough in its Russia policy, the US must devise compelling and time-sensitive incentives to prevent Russia from counter-maneuvering, procrastinating, or capitalizing on US-China tensions.
The Philippines: The Breach in the First Island Chain and China’s Proxy War
If Russia represents a high-level strategic lever, the Philippines is a tactical focal point for maritime power. As the southern anchor of the First Island Chain, the Philippines controls the strategic corridor from the South China Sea to the Taiwan Strait. Both the US and China recognize that whoever sways Manila’s stance will likely dominate the Indo-Pacific.
US Strategy: Strengthening Alliances and Building Missile Defenses
The Biden administration and the Marcos government have deepened military ties, adding four new US military bases in 2024, bringing the US troop presence in the Philippines to over 5,000 and deploying systems like Typhon and NMESIS. The 2025 Balikatan exercises reached an unprecedented scale, with Japan included as a formal participant for the first time, bolstering the military backbone of the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue).
The Philippines is not only the southern linchpin of the First Island Chain but also a forward outpost for the US to control South China Sea routes, maintain strategic depth in the Indo-Pacific, and uphold alliance credibility. Its strategic posture directly impacts the US’s operational flexibility and deterrence credibility around Guam, Palau, and Taiwan.
China’s Countermeasures: Economic Incentives, Military Coercion, and Information Proxy War
China seeks to sway the Philippines through a dual strategy of Belt and Road investments and South China Sea coercion. Economically, it deepens dependence through projects like the Davao Port; militarily, it intensifies gray-zone actions at reefs like Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal, including repeated harassment of Philippine resupply missions in 2024.
However, the linchpin of China’s strategy lies in its information and proxy warfare. Following the International Criminal Court’s 2024 arrest warrant against Duterte, China leveraged public opinion to redirect “anti-China” sentiment into “anti-Western” sentiment, ultimately aiding Duterte’s pro-China faction in securing breakthroughs in the 2025 Senate elections and local polls in Mindanao and the Visayas.
This divisive strategy could fracture the Philippines, with northern islands leaning toward the US and southern ones toward China, turning the country into a proxy battlefield, breaching US military containment, and tearing open the First Island Chain.
The Philippines’ Strategic Weight and Influence Radius
Despite its critical strategic location, the Philippines’ GDP of $450 billion and limited naval capabilities restrict its impact on a hot war to its posture and base availability rather than resource support or sustained combat capacity.
If China succeeds in fracturing the Philippines, Beijing will secure the South China Sea corridor, pierce the First Island Chain, address the Taiwan issue, and reshape the Indo-Pacific order, dealing a severe blow to US deterrence and undermining the confidence of its allies.
The Dual-Pivot Model and Strategic Conclusions
From the Ukraine war to South China Sea tensions, from supply chain shifts to military deployments, the US and China are both employing a “dual-pivot model” in their geopolitical contest:
- US: In the north, court Russia to dismantle the Sino-Russian alliance; in the south, stabilize the Philippines to solidify the First Island Chain.
- China: In the north, secure Russia to maintain land power depth; in the south, fracture the Philippines to breach the First Island Chain.
If the US can integrate Russia strategically by 2026, it will establish a “land power barrier” stretching from Northeast Asia through Central Asia to South Asia, complemented by the First Island Chain and AUKUS maritime containment, achieving a comprehensive land-sea encirclement of China. If China captures the Philippines pivot, it may not immediately alleviate land power pressures but could gain tactical maneuverability in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, breaking through the First Island Chain.
Conclusion: The Outcome Hangs in the Balance, Pivots Reign Supreme
The years 2025–2026 will mark a turning point in the US-China geopolitical struggle. Trump has initiated the Russia-Ukraine ceasefire process, potentially fracturing the Sino-Russian axis; meanwhile, China continues to pressure and infiltrate the Philippines, aiming to overturn the maritime balance.
This is a strategic contest centered on pivots. Whoever controls these critical nodes first will dominate the Indo-Pacific for decades to come, exerting profound influence on the global order.
Given Russia’s hedging strategy and the structural stalemate in US-China confrontation, China is highly likely to rapidly breach the First Island Chain. Whether Trump can swiftly win over Russia and prevent its delayed defection will be his first major strategic test as president.
