On March 11, 2025, the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) detention of Rodrigo Duterte was intended to amplify the Philippines’ 73% anti-China sentiment (Social Weather Stations, 2024 trend), spotlighting the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) assertive actions in the South China Sea. However, the CCP’s calculated disinformation campaign redirected this sentiment into anti-Western sentiment, facilitating Duterte’s camp’s success in the May 12, 2025, senatorial elections, securing approximately five seats (e.g., Bong Go, Ronald dela Rosa) and strengthening its influence in Mindanao and parts of the Visayas. This electoral outcome is not a reflection of organic public support but a strategic maneuver by the CCP, signaling a potential fracture of the Philippines into a pro-U.S. Luzon north and a pro-China Palawan-to-Mindanao south, with the Visayas as a contested region. The CCP’s navy, with approximately 450 warships and over 600 total vessels (including 350 coast guard ships, IISS, 2024), holds localized superiority in the Indo-Pacific, outmatching the U.S.’s 35% Indo-Pacific deployment (Seventh Fleet, ~200 ships, CSIS, 2023). This naval advantage positions the CCP to pursue a potential armed operation in Palawan, utilizing Duterte’s camp as a proxy to breach the First Island Chain, control the $3.4 trillion South China Sea trade route, and challenge the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. For the Philippines and the Western world, this scenario presents a significant strategic risk. Without coordinated countermeasures, the CCP’s actions could destabilize the First Island Chain, threatening the Indo-Pacific’s geopolitical balance.
Opening Gambit: The CCP’s ICC Strategy and Philippine Electoral Dynamics
The ICC’s detention of Duterte (March 11, 2024) for alleged “crimes against humanity” in his drug war was designed to address human rights concerns but was co-opted by the CCP as a geopolitical tool. The Philippines’ 73% anti-China sentiment (75% in 2024, Social Weather Stations), driven by incidents like the June 2024 Second Thomas Shoal collision, provided a potential rallying point for anti-CCP mobilization. However, the CCP’s information operations shifted this narrative. A Cyabra report indicates that 45% of election-related online discussions were driven by fake accounts, framing the ICC as a “Western imperialist intervention” and fueling anti-U.S. and anti-Marcos sentiment in Mindanao (80% voter turnout, 70% support for Duterte’s camp) and areas like Cebu in the Visayas. By leveraging this disinformation, Duterte’s camp redirected anti-China sentiment into criticism of Marcos’s “pro-U.S. alignment,” securing ~5 senatorial seats in 2025 and setting the stage for regional divisions.
From an Indo-Pacific strategic perspective, the CCP’s manipulation of the ICC event targets the First Island Chain (Kuril Islands-Okinawa-Taiwan-Philippines). Duterte’s camp, with its history of pro-China policies—downplaying the 2016 South China Sea arbitration ruling, securing $9.1 billion in “Belt and Road” commitments (2016-2022), and enabling Chinese access to the Philippine EEZ via a 2018 oil-gas deal—serves as a strategic proxy for the CCP. Its anti-Western rhetoric, amplified by CCP disinformation, facilitates conditions for a potential Palawan crisis. This is less a domestic political shift than a calculated step in the CCP’s broader Indo-Pacific strategy.
The CCP’s Naval Advantage: A Strategic Enabler in the Indo-Pacific
The CCP’s strategy in the Philippines is underpinned by its naval superiority in the Indo-Pacific. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), with a 2025 budget of approximately $178.2 billion (SIPRI, 2024 trend), operates ~450 warships (e.g., Fujian-class carriers, Type 055 destroyers, Type 094 submarines) and over 600 total vessels (including 350 coast guard ships, IISS, 2024), closely rivaling the U.S. Navy’s ~550 ships (290 warships, 11 carriers, $230 billion budget, USNI, 2024). However, U.S. forces are distributed globally—Atlantic, Mediterranean, Persian Gulf—leaving only ~35% of its assets (~200 ships, Seventh Fleet, CSIS, 2023) in the Indo-Pacific. In contrast, the CCP concentrates nearly its entire naval force in the South and East China Seas, supported by J-20 fighters and DF-21D missiles, enabling it to overpower smaller navies like the Philippines (~30 vessels, $2 billion budget, IISS, 2024) or Vietnam (~80 vessels). This localized advantage equips the CCP to pursue aggressive strategic objectives in the region.
Palawan’s Strategic Risk: A Potential Breach in the First Island Chain
The CCP may target Palawan as a strategic flashpoint, potentially initiating an armed operation resembling a rapid, decisive strike. With its naval and coast guard capabilities, the CCP could focus on Sabina Shoal, Sandy Cay, or Pag-asa Island, neutralizing Philippine forces (Western Command, thousands strong) swiftly. The June 2024 Second Thomas Shoal collision and possible 2025 Sandy Cay tensions (projected from current trends) suggest escalating provocations. The CCP could use narratives like “protecting fishermen” or diplomatic overtures like the “South China Sea Code of Conduct” to obscure its intentions, capitalizing on U.S. commitments elsewhere—Ukraine, Middle East ($858 billion defense budget, CBO, 2024)—to limit rapid response.
Should Palawan come under CCP influence, it might transfer nominal control to Duterte’s camp, establishing a proxy regime spanning Palawan to Mindanao, similar to Russia’s approach in Crimea. This regime, reliant on CCP military support (e.g., missiles, fighters, radar in Palawan) and economic incentives (e.g., Davao port, Reed Bank oil-gas, EIA, 2023), would undermine the First Island Chain’s integrity. Palawan, as the South China Sea’s northeastern gateway, is critical; its compromise would enable PLAN to project power into the Western Pacific, isolate U.S.’s 9 EDCA bases in Luzon (equipped with HIMARS, 2024 Balikatan), threaten Guam, and erode U.S. containment efforts.
The Philippines’ Potential Fracture: Implications for the Indo-Pacific
A CCP-driven operation in Palawan could precipitate the Philippines’ division, with significant consequences for the Indo-Pacific:
- Northern Philippines (Luzon): The Marcos government, based in Metro Manila (~35% GDP, PSA, 2024) and supported by 9 EDCA bases, would remain the U.S.’s primary foothold in the First Island Chain. U.S. commitments to defend Philippine vessels (CSIS, 2024) and $2 billion in Indo-Pacific Economic Framework aid (2024) sustain Luzon, but its isolation would limit its strategic influence.
- Southern Philippines (Palawan to Mindanao): Influenced by CCP incentives, Duterte’s camp could pursue autonomy, controlling Palawan, Mindanao, and parts of Eastern Visayas as a CCP-aligned entity, dependent on Chinese military and economic resources.
- Visayas as a Contested Region: Divisions between Cebu (influenced by Chinese investments) and Iloilo (aligned with Marcos and U.S. support) would position the Visayas as a zone of competition, further weakening national cohesion.
From an Indo-Pacific perspective, this division would compromise the First Island Chain, exposing Taiwan to intensified CCP pressure, disrupting Japan and South Korea’s maritime supply lines, and undermining the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (launched 2018). The CCP could dominate the $3.4 trillion South China Sea trade route (one-third of global shipping, CSIS, 2024) and exploit 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of gas (EIA, 2023), solidifying its regional influence.
Strategic Warning to the Western World: Countering the CCP’s Ambitions
This scenario poses a critical challenge to the Western world—Philippines, U.S., Australia, Japan, Europe. The CCP’s opportunistic use of Duterte’s camp as a proxy, combined with its naval advantage, pursues three strategic objectives:
- Weakening the First Island Chain: Control over Palawan would allow PLAN to bypass Philippine defenses, isolate U.S. bases in Luzon and Okinawa, threaten Guam, and dismantle Indo-Pacific containment.
- Pressuring Taiwan and East Asian Allies: South China Sea dominance would enhance CCP leverage over Taiwan, potentially through 2025 encirclement exercises (projected from 2022 trends), while disrupting Japan (90% oil imports) and South Korea (70% gas imports, EIA, 2024), weakening the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral (2023 Camp David Summit).
- Altering Global Dynamics: South China Sea control would elevate energy and food prices, affecting 15% of global trade (CSIS, 2024), potentially emboldening actors like Russia and Iran and accelerating shifts in global power dynamics.
The Western world must implement coordinated countermeasures:
- Strengthen the First Island Chain: The U.S. should expand EDCA deployments (additional missiles, carriers) and conduct joint exercises with Japan and Australia in Luzon and Vietnam to deter CCP actions in Palawan.
- Build ASEAN Cohesion: The Philippines should align with Vietnam and Indonesia to counter the CCP’s “South China Sea Code of Conduct” negotiations, overcoming ASEAN divisions (e.g., Cambodia, Laos).
- Economic Measures: Western allies should leverage IPEF and sanctions to limit CCP economic influence in southern Philippines (2024 debt: $84 billion, BSP, 2024), constraining its proxy’s viability.
- Information Strategy: Publicize the CCP’s 45% fake account operations (Cyabra, 2024) and its influence over Duterte’s camp, mobilizing the Philippines’ 73% anti-China sentiment to foster national unity.
Conclusion: A Strategic Imperative
The Philippines is a cornerstone of the Indo-Pacific; its potential division represents a strategic threat to Western interests. The CCP’s exploitation of the ICC event to bolster Duterte’s camp, coupled with its naval superiority, positions it to pursue a Palawan operation, fracture the First Island Chain, and undermine the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Western hesitation—U.S. commitments to global conflicts (Ukraine, Middle East), Philippine regional tensions, or ASEAN’s internal divisions—could enable the CCP to dominate the South China Sea, pressure Taiwan and East Asian allies, and shift global power dynamics. The Western world must act decisively with military, economic, and diplomatic measures, while fostering Philippine unity, to counter the CCP’s ambitions and preserve the Indo-Pacific’s stability. Failure to respond risks the erosion of the First Island Chain and a significant setback for the Indo-Pacific’s geopolitical framework.
